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Reinforcement learning theory has generated substantial interest in neurobiology, particularly because of the resemblance between
phasic dopamine and rewardprediction errors. Actor–critic theories have been adapted to account for the functions of the striatum,with
parts of the dorsal striatum equated to the actor. Here, we specifically test whether the human dorsal striatum—as predicted by an
actor–critic instantiation—is used on a trial-to-trial basis at the time of choice to choose in accordance with reinforcement learning
theory, as opposed to a competing strategy: the gambler’s fallacy. Using a partial-brain functionalmagnetic resonance imaging scanning
protocol focusedon the striatumandother ventral brain areas,we found that the dorsal striatum ismore activewhen choosing consistent
with reinforcement learning compared with the competing strategy. Moreover, an overlapping area of dorsal striatum along with the
ventral striatum was found to be correlated with reward prediction errors at the time of outcome, as predicted by the actor–critic
framework. These findings suggest that the same region of dorsal striatum involved in learning stimulus–response associations may
contribute to the control of behavior during choice, thereby using those learned associations. Intriguingly, neither reinforcement learn-
ing nor the gambler’s fallacy conformed to the optimal choice strategy on the specific decision-making task we used. Thus, the dorsal
striatummay contribute to the control of behavior according to reinforcement learning evenwhen the prescriptions of such an algorithm
are suboptimal in terms of maximizing future rewards.
Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL) models have stimulated consider-
able interest as a framework for understanding reward-related
learning in biological organisms (Schultz et al., 1997; Doya, 1999;
Daw et al., 2006). The phasic activity of midbrain dopamine neu-
rons resembles a reward prediction error (PE) signal inherent in
RL models (Schultz et al., 1997; Hollerman and Schultz, 1998),
and human neuroimaging studies have reported PEs in the stria-
tum, a prominent target of such neurons (O’Doherty et al., 2007).
Different regions of the striatum show unique correlations with
PEs depending on the nature of the task: studies involving action
selection for reward implicate the dorsal and ventral striatum,
while those involving only stimulus–reward associations report
PEs primarily in the ventral striatum (O’Doherty et al., 2004).
Such results are best understood in terms of actor– critic variants
of RL whereby PEs projecting to a dorsal striatal actor modulate
the probability of selecting particular actions, while PEs project-
ing to a ventral striatal critic update stimulus–reward associations
(Montague et al., 1996; Sutton and Barto, 1998; O’Doherty et al.,
2007; Scho¨nberg et al., 2007).
Much less is known about striatal contributions in guiding
action-selection itself. Schönberg et al. (2007) reported significant
differences in reward PEs in the dorsal striatum as a function of
between-subject performance differences on a simple reward task.
Other work revealed correlations between the magnitude of dorsal
striatal activity and the degree to which subjects evidenced behav-
ioral reward-learning, along with the degree to which individuals
perceived the existence of a contingency between actions and reinforce-
ment (Haruno et al., 2004; Tricomi et al., 2004). These findings suggest
that the dorsal striatum contributes to RL-consistent action selection,
yet the extent to which neural activity in the dorsal striatum couples
directly to behavior during individual choices remains unaddressed.
Conversely, despite the utility of RL, not all human choice
behavior coheres to this framework, particularly, the “gambler’s
fallacy” (Jarvik, 1951). Individuals adhering to the gambler’s fal-
lacy (GF) appear to assume non-independence between sequen-
tial outcomes, consistent with the belief that the probability of
obtaining a reward decreases after recent reinforcement; conse-
quently, they increase their probability of choosing an action that
was not recently rewarded (Estes, 1964; Tversky and Kahneman,
1971). Individuals in a real casino have demonstrated the fallacy
(Croson and Sundali, 2005), and when non-humans (e.g., a com-
puter or slot machine) generate sequences of events, the se-
quences are considered more likely to show the negative recency
expected by GF (Ayton and Fischer, 2004). More recent work has
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examined factors modulating GF and the extent to which it rep-
resents rationality (Hahn and Warren, 2009; Barron and Leider,
2010).
Our goal is to ascertain the dorsal striatum’s role in choice,
hypothesizing a role for this region in mediating RL-consistent
behavior. Our task was designed to elicit a variety of choice strat-
egies across trials and human functional magnetic resonance im-
aging (fMRI; using a restricted field of view encompassing the
orbitofrontal cortex ventrally, extending as far as the dorsal bor-
ders of the striatum) to measure variation in activity in this area as
a function of different choice behavior.
Materials andMethods
Thirty-one participants—18 female and 13 male— completed four 13
min 2 s runs of a roulette wheel task while lying in a whole-body magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) scanner. Three subjects’ fMRI data were ex-
cluded because of technical problems with the MRI scanner. Each of the
four runs consisted of three experimental blocks and one control block.
Each experimental block consisted of 16 trials; control blocks contained
4 trials. Each run began with 20 s of a fixation cross and ended with a final
fixation period of variable length. On each trial, the participant saw a
tricolored roulette wheel with 40% of the area covered by one color (Hi)
and the remaining 60% of the area covered by two other colors in equal
proportion (Lo options). Participants were clearly and correctly in-
structed that the amount of area covered by a color indicated the proba-
bility that the spinner would land on that color and that the stopping
probability of the spinner was completely independent from one trial to
the next. If the spinner stopped on the chosen color, participants won €2.
On every experimental trial, regardless of whether or not an option was
chosen, participants were charged €0.50. The optimal choice method is
to choose the color filling a larger proportion of the wheel, resulting in a
per trial expected value of 0.40 · 2  0.50  0.30 for each of the 192
experimental trials. At the end of the experiment, participants were given
the amount that they won over the course of the experiment, in addition
to €5 for participation.
The location (left, right, or top) of each color differed between partic-
ipants but within participants was constant for the entire task. Between
each experimental block, the size of the area covered by each color
changed (e.g., on block 1, blue might cover 40% of the area but on block
2, red would cover 40% of the area), but within each block the area
remained constant. Within each run, each color covered 40% of the area
for one entire block. At the trial onset, the wheel appeared and subjects
had 1500 ms to select a color with their right hand (Fig. 1). Afterward, a
spinner appeared, spun for 3000 ms, and then stopped abruptly, remain-
ing visible for a further 500 ms. The outcome was then revealed and
remained on-screen for 1000 ms. The intertrial interval (ITI) was drawn
from a quasi-normal distribution, ranging from 4000 to 12,000 ms with
a mean of 8000 ms, during which time a fixation cross was presented
on-screen. The outcome image was either a €2 coin (win) or the same
coin with a red X covering it (loss). Although suboptimal for enabling
estimation of the two time points in the trial (cue and outcome), the spin
period was not temporally jittered due to the fact that dopamine neuron
PEs projecting to the striatum are known to approximate the properties
of a temporal difference learning algorithm. Introducing temporal un-
predictability in the time of outcome presentation via spin period jitter-
ing could introduce confounding time varying PE responses in the
interstimulus interval (O’Doherty et al., 2003).
Control blocks were identical except for the following changes: there
were only 4 trials per block, the entire wheel was shown in gray (partici-
pants were told to select any of the three available buttons), and the ITI
was drawn from a quasi-uniform distribution with a mean of 8000 ms.
The outcome image was a scrambled version of the €2 coin. At the start of
each block, a screen appeared for 2000 ms, with the following text: “New
Round Get Ready.”
We were interested in behavior during a truly independent and iden-
tically distributed scenario; therefore, no attempt was made to regulate
the number of streaks of each length. Had we regulated the number of
streaks of each length, the environment would have transitioned to sam-
pling without replacement; in such an environment, GF-consistent be-
havior is no longer a fallacy but rather is rational (this is because such
environments show the negative recency expected by GF). This resulted
in differing numbers of streaks of each length. The mean frequencies of
win and loss streaks for Hi and Lo outcomes at each streak length are
displayed in Table 1.
Informed consent was obtained and the study was approved by the
School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee at Trinity College
Dublin. Participants received detailed instructions, were guided through
4 practice trials, and then completed 4 practice trials in real time (no
feedback regarding the outcomes of their choice was revealed during any
of these practice trials).
Behavioral model fitting and comparison. Different variants of RL models
were fit to the behavioral data, although for clarity, only one experimen-
tal model is presented. This model best fit the individuals who were
classified as RL-consistent (described in Results). This model was SARSA
(state-action-reward-state-action) learning according to
Qit  Qit  1    Rit  1  Qit  1, (1)
Figure 1. Roulette gambling task. Participants were given 1000 ms to select a colored option.
After1000ms, ifanoptionwasselected(here,asdenotedbythe lightenedcolor,greenwasselected),
a spinner appeared and spun for 3000ms, and after stopping, remained on-screen for a further 500
ms.Therewardwasdisplayedfor1000ms.Ifthespinnerstoppedontheselectedcolor,aswasthecase
here, theparticipantreceived€2;otherwise,heorshewonnothingandthesamecoinsuperimposed
with a red Xwas displayed. ITIwas jittered,with amean 8000ms.
Table 1. Mean frequencies per streak length, separated by outcome
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hi Win 43.65 16.42 6.06 2.45 1.16 0.52 0.10
Hi Lose 39.10 22.97 14.10 8.42 4.77 2.74 1.39
Lo Win 75.81 20.55 6.23 1.52 0.42 0.16 0.03
Lo Lose 80.35 54.06 36.16 23.19 15.39 10.39 6.52
Data represent the mean frequencies across subjects for consecutive identical outcomes; e.g., column 2 of Hi Win
shows that themeannumberper subject of consecutivewins for theHi optionhavinga streakof 2or greater is 16.42.
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with fictive (also known as full information or foregone payoff) updat-
ing. The fictive component allows for individuals to learn from options
that were not selected; this is appropriate in our task as it always reveals
the winning option via the spinner stopping location. In the above for-
mula, Qi(t) represents the value of choosing option i on trial t. This
quantity is computed by adding the Q value on the previous trial to the
product of the updating parameter  and the (fictive) PE. The PE is the
difference between the fictive reward amount R that would have been
received had option i been chosen on the preceding trial and the previous
Q value for option i. Note that this differs slightly from a traditional
PE—in which the Q value for only the chosen option is updated— be-
cause the spinner stopping location informs the participant what he or
she would have received regardless of his or her selection.Ri 1 if option
i won, otherwise 0. Values for Qi(0) were initialized to the observed win
probabilities, as described on the roulette wheel (i.e., [0.4, 0.3, 0.3]).
The softmax choice rule, a specific implementation of the Luce choice




t/ ⁄jJ eQjt/ . (2)
Here, the probability P of choosing option i on trial t is obtained by first
exponentiating the quotient of the Q value for option i divided by the
inverse temperature parameter . This value is then divided by the sum
over all options j (out of the total set of options J ) of the exponentiated
quotient of theQ value for each option j divided by the scaling parameter
. For each new block, Qi(0) was reset to the observed win probabilities
for each of the options i. There were two free parameters in this RL
model:  and .
In addition to RL models, we also fit multiple variants of an existing GF
model (Rabin, 2002), adapted for our task, along with other unique
instantiations. The best overall version was flexible enough to coarsely
account for RL behavioral patterns as well:
Qit    it    Qi0. (3)
As above, Qi(t) represents the value of choosing option i on trial t. This
quantity is computed by obtaining the difference between the crossover
tolerance parameter  and the length of the current win streak  for
option i on trial t. This difference is multiplied by the updating parameter
 and then added to the initialized win probability for that option Qi(0)
as presented on the roulette wheel. Values forQi(0) were initialized to the
observed win probabilities, as described on the roulette wheel (i.e., [0.4,
0.3, 0.3]). The Q value for each option was updated on each trial and all
Q values were scaled to sum to unity for each trial. If the minimum Q
value was0, allQ values were shifted up until the min(Q) 0 and then
the Q values were scaled to sum to unity.
Note that while this model shares similarities with the SARSA learning
rule used above, it also deviates in important ways. First, unlike RL mod-
els, on each trial t this model updates Qi(0) instead of Qi(t1). Second,
the difference of the crossover tolerance parameter and the streak length
can effectively cause the learning rate parameter to switch signs after a
fixed number of consecutive identical outcomes (the learning rate pa-
rameter was allowed to vary in the range [1, 1]). Hence, when the
crossover tolerance parameter exceeded the win streak and the updating
parameter was positive ( ), the likelihood of selecting the streaking
option increased, a` la RL. Conversely, when either the crossover toler-
ance parameter value was less than the win streak parameter and the
updating parameter was positive ( ) or the crossover tolerance pa-
rameter value exceeded the streak length value and the updating param-
eter value was negative ( ), the likelihood of selecting the streaking
option decreased, a` la GF. If a trial was missed, then the probabilities for
choosing on the ensuing trial were reset to the initial win probabilities. As
with the RL model, the softmax choice rule was used to generate choice
predictions. There were three free parameters in this model: , , .
The best fitting parameters were found for each individual by mini-
mizing the negative log likelihood of the predictions, using fminsearch, a
hill-climbing algorithm in Matlab (MathWorks). The fit values for each
subject were then compared with the fit values from a saturated baseline
model which perfectly reproduced the marginal choice probabilities and
hence had two free parameters. The only way an experimental model
(i.e., RL or GF) could outperform such a baseline model was to account
for learning or strategy-related changes in individuals’ behavior.
The comparison method used was the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) (Schwarz, 1978):
BIC  2 · (LLE  LLB)  k · ln N. (4)
Here, the difference in the log likelihood for the experimental model LLE
and that of the baseline model LLB is doubled and then added to the
product of the additional free parameters k for the experimental model and
the log of the data pointsN. As formulated above, this is technically a relative
BIC, indicating superior performance of the experimental model when pos-
itive, and superior performance of the baseline model when negative.
fMRI acquisition and data preprocessing. The task was conducted in a
Philips Achieva 3T scanner using a phased-array eight channel head coil.
The imaging data were acquired at a 30° angle from the anterior commis-
sure–posterior commissure line to maximize orbital sensitivity (Deich-
mann et al., 2003), using a gradient echo T2* weighted echoplanar
imaging sequence; 32 2.8 mm ascending slices were acquired with a 0.3
mm slice gap (echo time 30 ms; repetition time 2000 ms; voxel size
2 mm, 2 mm, 2.8 mm; matrix 112 112 voxels; field of view 224 224
mm). The field of view extended from the orbitofrontal cortex and ven-
tral striatum to the superior border of the dorsal striatum. A total of 390
images were collected in each of four runs totaling 1560 functional scans.
High-resolution T1 images were collected at the beginning of the session
for each participant.
SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London,
UK; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) was used to preprocess and analyze the
data. The functional data for each participant were slice time corrected to
the first slice and then spatially realigned using a six parameter rigid body
spatial transformation. The high-resolution structural image was then
coregistered to the mean functional image generated by the realignment
phase. The mean functional was spatially normalized to the echoplanar
imaging template, and the resulting warping parameters were then applied
to the realigned functionals and the coregistered structural image. The func-
tionals were then spatially smoothed using an 8 mm Gaussian kernel.
fMRI analysis. We examined changes in blood oxygenation level-
dependent (BOLD) response across conditions using a general linear
model (GLM) with random effects. For each subject, multiple GLMs
were estimated. A 128 s high-pass cutoff filter and a first-order autore-
gressive correction for serial correlation were applied to each model. Task
conditions were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response
function and then entered into the GLM matrix. Each scan of each GLM
included a baseline regressor and six movement regressors, generated
from the spatial realignment preprocessing step. Additionally, each
model had one regressor each for the initial fixation period, final fixation
period, at the time of the onset of the roulette wheel for all missed trials,
and at the onset of the wheel for neutral trials. The fixation regressors had
duration lengths equal to the length of the fixation period.
For statistical inference we used an omnibus height threshold of p 
0.005, and then corrected for multiple comparisons at p  0.05 family-
wise error ( pFWE) within small volumes defined on a priori regions of
interest in the dorsal striatum, amygdala, and ventromedial prefrontal
cortex. For these we took coordinates from relevant prior studies and
performed correction for multiple comparison within an 8 mm sphere as
described in Results. The extent threshold ( pFWE_cluster) and cluster
size k are reported for each comparison. The MNI (Montreal Neurolog-
ical Institute) coordinates for the dorsal striatum were taken from a paper
which found overlapping PEs within the left dorsal striatum across a
variety of rewarding stimuli during an instrumental learning task [9, 3,
15] (Valentin and O’Doherty, 2009). Because participants in our task
used their right hand to make a choice, it was reasonable to expect acti-
vation lateralized to the left of the dorsal striatum. The MNI coordinates
for the amygdala were from a paper which used high-resolution imaging
to examine reward-based activation in an instrumental learning task in
bilateral amygdala (Prevost et al., 2011). The left [23,7.5,19] and
right [25, 4.5, 19] coordinates were separately averaged across the
multiple significant voxels in each hemisphere from that paper. The MNI
6298 • J. Neurosci., April 27, 2011 • 31(17):6296–6304 Jessup and O’Doherty • Reinforcement Learning in the Striatum
coordinates for ventromedial prefrontal cortex were obtained from a
paper which used instrumental choice to look for goal-directed signals
within this region [0, 33, 24] (Valentin et al., 2007). When multiple
significant peaks within a single cluster were observed, the statistics for
only the maximal peak voxel are reported.
Categorical GLM.The categorical GLM was designed to look for BOLD
differences observed when choosing according to RL versus GF. Separate
regressors were used to account for neural activity at both the choice and
the outcome feedback stage. For the choice phase, one regressor was used
for the first trial on each block, as this trial was irrelevant to choosing
according to RL or GF. All other choices were defined according to the Hi
option because it was expected to draw most of the attention because of
its dominance. Regressors were further separated on the basis of multiple
factors: whether the Hi option won on the previous trial (Hi Won or Hi
Lost), whether the streak length—i.e., how many consecutive identical
outcomes for the Hi option—was one or greater (1 or 1), whether the
participant chose the Hi option on the current trial (Chose Hi, Chose Not
Hi), and whether this choice was identical to the previous choice (stay or
switch). Thus, a participant who experienced and engaged in all of these
behaviors would have 1  2  2  2  9 regressors beyond the aforemen-
tioned regressors. This approach captures nearly all possible choices. On rare
occasions a participant switched from one of the low-probability options to
the other, adding a maximum of 2  2  1  4 more regressors. All of these
regressors were placed at the onset of the roulette wheel time point. For the
feedback stage, one regressor was added for each of the four possible out-
comes: win, lose, neutral, and missed choice. These regressors were placed at
the time point on which the spinner stopped spinning. Missed responses
were registered on only 3 experimental trials and 0.5 control trials on average,
across subjects.
The regressors shown in Table 2 were used to test the RL versus GF
striatal hypothesis, using outcome streaks 1. Essentially, this contrast
compares trials on which a subject chooses (does not choose) the Hi
when it is winning (losing) with trials on which the subject chooses (does
not choose) the Hi when it is losing (winning). Note that this contrast
controls for differences in switch versus stay activity, choice of Hi versus
a Lo option, and whether the preceding trial resulted in a win or loss.
RL GLM. The RL GLM used a model-based analysis to reveal BOLD
increases correlating with the time series extracted from the predictions
using the best fitting parameters from an RL model fit to each partici-
pant’s behavioral data. The RL model used here differed slightly from the
model described above, in that fictive updating was not applied, as this
implementation slightly outperformed the model with fictive updating
across all subjects. For each trial, the Q(chosen option) was entered into
the GLM as a parametric modulator onto a choice regressor. Likewise, an
outcome regressor was modulated by the PE extracted from the RL
model. As with the categorical model, a separate regressor was added in at
the time of feedback for missed choice trials.
Results
Behavioral
Because the known win probabilities were unequal for the three
options, the Hi option stochastically dominates. Behavioral vio-
lations of stochastic dominance demonstrate irrationality (Died-
erich and Busemeyer, 1999); hence, individuals should always
choose the Hi option, or, allowing for errors, on 95% of the
trials. However, across all participants, the mean probability of
choosing the Hi option Pr(Choose Hi)  0.64 and median Pr-
(Choose Hi)  0.59. Thus, over one third of all choices can be
classified as irrational, significantly0 (t(30)  9.97, p 0.001).
Considerable individual differences in choice behavior were
observed and participants naturally separated into two patterns:
environmental adherence and feedback responding. Environ-
mental adherers tend to ignore outcomes, adhering only to the
described probabilities as presented on the roulette wheel, not the
outcome feedback. Feedback responders allow for the roulette
outcomes to drive their behavior. These latter individuals sepa-
rate into two further patterns: RL-consistent and GF-consistent,
i.e., those who choose an option that has been winning and those
who choose an option that has been losing, respectively. The
following metric discriminates between the three patterns:
RL metric  100 · (Pr(Choose Hi(t 2)  Hi Won(t, t 1))
 Pr(Choose Hi(t  2)  Hi Lost(t, t  1))). (5)
The RL metric indexes whether individuals were more likely to
choose the Hi option when it was winning compared with when it
was losing. The RL metric is then weighted by each participant’s
relevant likelihood of choosing a low-probability option (i.e.,
trials that were relevant for deciphering whether or not they were
RL- or GF-consistent; e.g., this contained trials that were either
not the first in the block or did not follow a missed trial). Subjects
with an absolute weighted RL metric1 tended toward environ-
mental adherence. RL-consistent participants had a weighted RL
metric 1, meaning that they were more likely to choose the Hi
Figure 2. Behavioral results andmodeling. The choice data for each subject were separately
fit to the RL model described in the text. Subjects were classified according to the weighted RL
metric into three patterns of behavior: environmental adherence, RL-consistent, and GF-
consistent. The panels show the mean choice behavior (data points) and model predictions
(lines), separated by pattern (environmental adherence in the top, RL-consistent in themiddle,
GF-consistent in the bottom), and plotted according to the number of consecutive identical
outcomes (horizontal axis) and the probability of choosing the outcome that is “streaking”
(vertical axis). The different possible streaks areHiWin (red), LoWin (green), Hi Lose (blue), and
Lo Lose (black). Note that the RL model predictions follow the qualitative trend of behavior for
the environmental adherer and RL-consistent patterns but not the GF-consistent pattern.










RL Hi Not Hi Switch Not Hi
RL Not Hi Hi Switch Hi
RL Hi Hi Stay Hi
RL Not Hi Not Hi Stay Not Hi
GF Not Hi Not Hi Switch Hi
GF Hi Hi Switch Not Hi
GF Not Hi Hi Stay Not Hi
GF Hi Not Hi Stay Hi
Not Hi refers to either of the two Lo probability options. Switching between Lo options was relatively rare; thus,
while separate regressors were created for these events, they were not included in the contrast. Each of the above
regressors contained streaks of two or more identical consecutive outcomes.
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when it was winning rather than losing. GF-consistent partici-
pants have a weighted RL metric 	1. The three patterns of
behavior and the best fits of their data to the RL model are pre-
sented in Figure 2. While environmental adherers (n  8) and
RL-consistent subjects (n 6) were well fit by the RL model, it is
unable to capture the qualitative patterns shown in the GF-
consistent subjects (n  17), as they tended to choose a losing
option, in contradiction to standard RL theory. Table 3 presents
the median best fitting parameters and BIC value across subjects
separated by choice pattern for both models. Positive BIC values
indicate that the model was superior to the baseline model. For
the RL model, only the RL-consistent subjects had a positive BIC
score as environmental adherers showed no learning-related
changes over time and GF-consistent subjects’ behavior defied
RL assumptions. For the GF model, both RL- and GF-consistent
subjects had positive BIC scores, but the model failed to fit either
of these groups as well as the RL model fit the RL-consistent
participants. Interestingly, more than half of all subjects are clas-
sified as GF-consistent.
While there are overall differences in the propensity of indi-
viduals to choose according to GF or RL, considerable trial-by-
trial variation was found within participants concerning whether
individual choices conformed to either strategy. Table 4 demon-
strates the considerable variance on a trial-to-trial basis. The fact
that the choice probabilities do not all load on either 0 or 1 reveals
this variance (the mean choice probabilities are shown separated
by group to demonstrate that this considerable variance is not
merely an artifact of averaging over participants with widely dis-
parate choice strategies). Based on this observation, we first de-
scribe analyses of within-subject variation in strategy in the
neuroimaging data before moving on to explore effects of varia-
tion in overall strategy used between subjects.
Neuroimaging
Within-subject analyses
Of primary interest is the extent to which neural activity in the
dorsal striatum at the time of choice discriminates— on a trial-
to-trial basis—whether participants choose consistent with RL or
GF. All participants who were categorized as environmental ad-
herers— because they ignored observed outcomes—were ex-
cluded and the analysis was run on the feedback responders. [To
maintain a balanced design, only the subjects with all regressors
represented were entered in the contrast reported here (n 17);
however, the same pattern of results at the same statistical thresh-
old is found when all of the feedback responders are included.]
The results indicated that on a trial-to-trial basis, differences
in neural activations in the dorsal striatum existed when choosing
according to RL as opposed to GF. Figure 3 shows a voxel by voxel
map of the t statistics (tmap) overlaid onto the mean of the par-
ticipants’ structural images. The significant increase in activity
was observed in the left dorsal caudate (z 3.83, pFWE 0.003;
pFWE_cluster  0.006; k  147; peak voxel MNI coordinates:
[8, 10, 12]). When choosing consistently with RL principles,
individuals showed increased dorsal striatal activity compared
with when choosing consistently with GF. Using the RL GLM, we
then tested whether this dorsal striatal difference was due to a
difference in the expected reward corresponding to the chosen
action, as generated by the RL model, as opposed to being related
specifically to a discrimination between RL-consistent and RL-
inconsistent behavior. However, no significant correlations were
found with the Q value regressor generated by the RL model in
this region [even at uncorrected p ( pUnc)  0.05], suggesting
that the dorsal striatal activity at the time of choice is unlikely to
be driven simply by a difference in RL-generated estimates of
expected reward.
To further delineate the role of the dorsal striatum in RL, we
next tested for a corresponding relationship between dorsal cau-
date activation and PE. This would demonstrate that this region is
not only used for RL-consistent choices, as shown above, but also
updated by outcome feedback. We tested this with the RL GLM
by looking for a significant parametric modulation by PE on the
outcome regressor using the data from all participants. We found
that left caudate neural activity positively correlated with PE (Fig.
4A). Three peaks were found in a single cluster, all of which
exceeded a familywise error correction (z 3.07, pFWE 0.012;
pFWE_cluster 0.020; k 63; maximal peak MNI voxel coordi-
nates [6, 2, 10]). Hence, left dorsal caudate activity is modu-
lated by PE at the time of outcome. Additionally, we observed
whole-brain corrected significant activation in the left ventral
striatum (z  4.49, pFWE  0.038; pFWE_cluster  0.011; k 
1689; maximal peak MNI voxel coordinates [14, 0,16]). The
significant dorsal striatal cluster revealed by this contrast overlaps
with the significant cluster from the previous contrast (Fig. 4C),
suggesting that the same dorsal striatal region reports PE on all
trials but then is only used when choosing according to RL
principles.
We also set out to address whether PE activity observed in the
dorsal striatum was best accounted for in terms of the RL model
as opposed to that elicited by the GF model. An important feature
of the GF model (which is a weakness as well as a strength) is that
it is extremely flexible: it can capture both GF- and RL-consistent
Table 3. Median BIC and best fitting parameter values separated by group
Model Group BIC   1/
RL Environmental adherers 0.43 N/A 0.00 0.02
RL RL-consistent 9.10 N/A 0.03 0.21
RL GF-consistent 0.89 N/A 0.00 0.10
GF Environmental adherers 0.43 1.82 0.00 0.02
GF RL-consistent 2.87 2.27 0.04 0.17
GF GF-consistent 2.71 5.50 0.01 0.10
All data were fit at the individual level. BIC is positive where the experimental model outperformed the baseline
model. Parameters: is the crossover tolerance parameter and is used by the GFmodel to switch between RL- and
GF-consistent behavior; is the updating or learning rate parameter; is the temperature parameter and controls
the extent to which a participant behaves deterministically.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for choosing the Hi option, conditioned on previous
outcomes
N Choose Hi  Hi Won Choose Hi  Hi Lost
Environmental adherers 8 0.92 (0.12) 0.94 (0.11)
RL-consistent 6 0.77 (0.16) 0.47 (0.17)
GF-consistent 17 0.33 (0.16) 0.65 (0.13)
Total 31 0.57 (0.31) 0.69 (0.21)
The mean (standard deviation) conditional probabilities for choosing the Hi option conditioned on it winning or
losing consecutively 2 or more times are given, separated by group. High variance within subject choice is charac-
terized by choice probabilities within a cell that fail to load on either 0 or 1.
Figure3. Contrast of RL-with GF-consistent choices. Coronal (left) and sagittal (right) views
of the tmap of activation in the RL–GF contrast, thresholded at pUnc 0.001, k 100, and
overlaid onto themean of the participants’ structural images. Using a small volume correction,
the left caudate activity was significant at pFWE 0.05.
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behavior, depending on the specific parameter values that are
used. Indeed, the PE signal generated by the GF model will mimic
the RL PE under conditions where a participant’s behavior is
RL-like. Thus, although they are different in formulation, the RL
and GF models can be considered nested: the GF model essen-
tially accommodates everything captured in the RL model, and
has the additional flexibility to accommodate GF behavior. We
therefore conducted a nested model comparison of PE-related
activity starting with the most parsimonious model, the RL
model. Then we tested whether the PE signal engendered by the
GF model captures any additional variance in the dorsal striatum
above and beyond that which is captured by the RL model. To do
this, we slightly modified the RL GLM, entering in the PE signals
from both models as parametric regressors. Critically, we entered the
RL PE signal first in the design matrix, and the GF PE second. We
then tested whether additional activity in the dorsal striatum could
be captured by the GF model once the RL PE signal had accounted
for all of the common variance. We found no significant activity in
dorsal striatum loading on the GF regressor, even at pUnc 0.01.
Thus, we can conclude that the signal we observe in the dorsal stria-
tum is most parsimoniously accounted for by RL-based models.
Between-subject analyses
In addition to testing for strategy-dependent activity within sub-
jects, we also tested for brain regions showing modulation at
different time points as a function of the extent to which a sub-
ject’s overall choice behavior was consistent with GF or RL. To do
this, we used the categorical GLM to analyze activity in the feed-
back responders group during the gambling task compared with
the control task at two time points: the time of choice and the
time of outcome receipt. We then tested for areas responding in
this contrast at these two time points that were also modulated as
a function of the RL metric described in the behavioral results.
While no significant between-subject correlations with the RL
metric were found at the time of choice, at the time of outcome,
we found significant effects in two areas known to play a role in
encoding rewarding and punishing outcomes: the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex and bilateral amygdala (Fig. 5). For the ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex, two peaks were found in a single cluster,
both of which exceeded a familywise error correction (z 3.71,
pFWE  0.002; pFWE_cluster  0.011; k  144; maximal peak
MNI voxel coordinates [4, 28,24]). For the left amygdala, two
clusters, one with four peaks and the other with one peak, were
found, all exceeding a familywise error correction (z  3.02,
pFWE  0.013; pFWE_cluster  0.023; k  39; maximal peak
MNI voxel coordinates [22, 4, 26]), and one peak in one
cluster was found for the right amygdala (z  3.75, pFWE 
0.001; pFWE_cluster 0.012; k 143; peak MNI voxel coordinates
[24, 2, 18]). Activity in both of these regions in response to
outcomes—whether a rewarding or a punishing outcome compared
with a control outcome—was positively correlated with the RL met-
ric, such that the more an individual conformed to an RL strategy,
the greater the activity in these regions in response to outcomes.
Discussion
Our findings implicate the mid-caudate nucleus in the dorsal
striatum in mediating RL-consistent behavior. When subjects
made RL-consistent choices, activity in this region increased rel-
ative to trials on which subjects made RL-inconsistent choices.
We excluded other possible explanations for the activity, includ-
ing whether the preceding trial resulted in a gain or loss, whether
subjects maintained their existing choice or switched to a new
choice, and whether they chose the Hi or a Lo option. The finding
that the dorsal striatum is involved in the expression of RL-
consistent behavior builds on a large previous literature implicat-
ing the striatum in learning associations via RL mechanisms
(Wickens et al., 2003; Frank et al., 2004; Haruno et al., 2004;
Roitman et al., 2004; Yin et al., 2004; Knutson and Cooper, 2005;
Samejima et al., 2005; Atallah et al., 2007; Balleine et al., 2007; Lau
and Glimcher, 2008). This finding also resonates with previous
results indicating greater RL-related activity in the dorsal stria-
tum in subjects who learned to choose rewarding actions com-
pared with those who failed to learn (Scho¨nberg et al., 2007). The
present results extend those findings, by demonstrating that on a
trial-by-trial basis—when subjects choose in an RL-consistent
manner—the dorsal striatum is more engaged compared with
situations when alternate choice strategies are deployed.
The present results are pertinent to proposals regarding mul-
tiple mechanisms for guiding choice in the human brain (Shiffrin
and Schneider, 1977; Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Doya, 1999,
2002; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; McClure et al., 2004; Daw
et al., 2005; Atallah et al., 2007; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010).
One proposal postulates two competing systems: a model-based
system wherein choices are computed online using a “model”
or cognitive map of the decision problem, and a “model-free”
method, in which learned values acquired through trial and error
RL are used to generate choices (Daw et al., 2005). Our findings
could be interpreted as suggesting a role for the mid-dorsal stria-
tum in model-free RL. Simply choosing recently rewarded
actions and avoiding those that were not could be seen as model-
free RL, whereas adherence to GF could be construed as “model-
based,” in that adherence likely requires a richer representation of
the task structure—such as how many rewards or losses were
obtained and assumptions about the dependency between suc-
cessive choices of the same option.
It is notable that the same region of dorsal striatum engaged
during RL-consistent choice was also correlated with an RL-
generated PE signal at outcome time. These findings suggest that
the same area of dorsal striatum recruited for learning stimulus–
response associations might also be involved during choice when
those learned stimulus–response relationships are used to drive
behavior. Thus, neural systems involved in controlling choice
may substantially overlap with those involved in learning associ-
ations underpinning such behavior in the first place. These find-
Figure 4. Striatal activity at reward and choice.A, Coronal (left) and sagittal (right) views of
the tmapof activation fromthe correlationof BOLDactivationwith rewardPE fromanRLmodel,
thresholdedatpUnc0.005, k60, andoverlaidonto themeanof theparticipants’ structural
images. Using a small volume correction, the left caudate activity was significant at pFWE
0.05. B, Coronal view of the tmap of activation in the ventral striatum from the same contrast
and threshold as shown in A. The left ventral striatal activity was significant at pFWE 0.05,
corrected for thewhole brain. C, Coronal (left) and sagittal (right) views of the significant dorsal
striatal clusters that show increased activity during RL- compared with GF-consistent choice at
the time of stimulus onset (red), a positive correlationwith PE at the time of reward (blue), and
where the two clusters overlap (magenta).
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ings cohere with actor– critic models of the striatum, providing
further evidence that the dorsal striatum resembles the actor
(Montague et al., 1996; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010). It is also
possible that another region mediates RL-consistent choice and
that the dorsal striatum is more active in such choices because it
reports the stimulus–response associations pertinent to the pres-
ent choice, although that view is less parsimonious than the one
presented here. Further research will be needed to tease apart this
possibility from the present one.
We also tested for BOLD differences on a between-subject
basis as a function of the degree to which individual behavior was
overall biased toward exhibiting RL- or GF-like behavior. Al-
though we found no between-subject differences in the striatum,
we did find positive correlations between the degree of activity in
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and bilateral amygdala in re-
sponse to outcomes and the propensity for an individual to
choose according to RL. This indicates that RL adherents may
show enhanced processing of outcomes in these brain regions
relative to GF adherents. Increased sensitivity to outcomes could
potentially lead to a greater propensity for behavior to be con-
trolled by RL mechanisms compared with alternative strategies,
such as GF, that may instead require increased attention to other
task components.
It is notable that no brain regions were found to have in-
creased activity when subjects chose according to GF, nor did any
regions show enhanced activity across subjects as a function of
the propensity to exhibit GF behavior. However, we did not ob-
tain fMRI coverage over dorsal cortical regions including the
dorsolateral prefrontal or parietal cortex, and it is conceivable
that these areas might have greater involvement in the initiation
of GF behavior (Huettel et al., 2002; Akitsuki et al., 2003), espe-
cially if they are more relevant to model-based as opposed to
model-free learning (Gla¨scher et al., 2010). For example, when
individuals observed violations of patterns—regardless of whether
those patterns were of consecutively identical or alternating
events—increased activations were observed in medial frontal
gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus and anterior cingulate cortex
(Huettel et al., 2002). Further studies will be needed to com-
pare and contrast the role of these dorsal cortical brain areas in
mediating GF behavior.
Beyond the neural results, the present behavioral findings also
have implications for understanding choice behavior. Despite
receiving complete information about the nature of the task, the
majority of subjects failed to pursue the optimal strategy of al-
ways choosing the dominant option (the option yielding a 40%
chance of reward). Instead, most subjects varied their choices
Figure 5. Correlation of BOLD activity with RLmetric. A, Coronal (left) and sagittal (right) views of the tmap of activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex from the second-level correlation
of BOLD activitywith the RLmetric in the gambling– control contrast, thresholded at pUnc 0.001, k 60, and overlaid onto themean of the participants’ structural images. Using a small volume
correction, the cluster was significant at pFWE 0.05. B, Coronal (left) and sagittal (right) views of the tmap of activation in bilateral amygdala from the same contrast and threshold as shown in
A. C–E, Scatterplot showing individual data points for the RL metric plotted against the BOLD activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (C), left amygdala (D), and right amygdala (E) clusters,
together with regression lines of best fit through the data. As indicated by the weighted RL metric, circles are colored to denote group membership: GF-consistent (blue), RL-consistent (red). The
BOLD data in each plot were independently obtained by taking an 8 mm sphere centered on the same small volume coordinates for each region that were used to test for significant contrasts.
6302 • J. Neurosci., April 27, 2011 • 31(17):6296–6304 Jessup and O’Doherty • Reinforcement Learning in the Striatum
according to a mixture of RL and GF, both of which are subopti-
mal and therefore irrational in this context. This finding builds
on previous evidence that individuals tend to either ignore or fail
to adhere to described information in a task— even when that
information is available on each and every trial—and instead let
their choices be driven by either the experience of obtained feed-
back (Jessup et al., 2008) or perceived structure—such as inter-
dependencies between trials— even in direct contradiction to the
explicit instructions. Together, our behavioral results suggest
that two “irrational” though competing choice strategies ob-
served in this task tend to dominate choice behavior, even where
there is a clear rational alternative. One feasible counterargument
to the claim of “irrationality” is that it is possible that the behav-
ioral expression of GF found here could possibly be interpreted as
“rational” if volunteers harbored doubts about the veridical na-
ture of the experimenter instructions (Grether and Plott, 1979).
Rationality considerations notwithstanding, it is tempting to
conclude that these two distinct strategies may be ubiquitous in
human choice behavior.
An alternative interpretation is that since stochastic choice
functions such as the softmax rule predict variability in choice
behavior, GF-consistent choices could be generated by a stochas-
tic choice function, while the overall policy coheres with RL.
However, this possibility ignores the theoretical underpinnings
of stochastic choice functions such as the softmax rule. Typical
explanations for invoking the softmax rule include the notions of
environmental uncertainty, exploration, and between-subject
analyses (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Daw et al., 2006). However, in
the present task, the independence of outcomes was declared at
the task outset and the payoff distributions are fully described on
each trial; so there is no environmental uncertainty. Moreover,
because information about alternate outcomes is always pro-
vided, there is no need for exploration: an individual can exploit
while simultaneously learning about other options. Also, because
this interpretation relates to a within-subject analysis, the
between-subject explanation is irrelevant. Hence, while the soft-
max choice rule can describe choice behavior in this task, it is
unable to explain it. Thus, explanations beyond the softmax are
required to make sense of the data. Furthermore, and perhaps
most importantly, if the observed variability in responses was
purely due to noisy or disinterested responding, there should be
(1) little discernible pattern in behavioral choice and (2) no dif-
ference in dorsal striatal activity at the time of choice when choos-
ing according to RL as opposed to GF. However, as Figures 2 and
3 attest, both of these notions are ruled out. Likewise, more com-
plex decision strategies could be used to recategorize some of the
individual trials. However, for the same reason as above, this
critique can also be reasonably ruled out due to the observation of
reliable differences in brain activity using the current, more par-
simonious, manner of categorization.
To conclude, our findings implicate a part of the human dor-
sal striatum in choice behavior. These findings build on burgeon-
ing evidence implicating the dorsal striatum in the selection of
actions leading to reward, and in encoding of stimulus–response
or stimulus–response– outcome associations (Lauwereyns et al.,
2002; Hikosaka et al., 2006; Balleine et al., 2007). At the point of
choice, the mid-caudate is involved in driving choice behavior
only when that behavior coheres with the predictions of RL and
not alternative, model-based strategies. Intriguingly, in the pres-
ent study, the most common choice strategies—whether RL- or
GF-like— deviate from rationality. Thus, the dorsal striatum may
contribute to the control of behavior according to RL even when
the prescriptions of such an algorithm are patently suboptimal.
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